April 13, 2025.
Emerging from the instability created by the invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, more commonly called the Islamic State or ISIS, was able to conquer large amounts of territory in Syria and Iraq, ruling over a population of 12 million people at its height in 2014. Following Salafi jihadism, and a Sunni-Islamist ideology that seeks to establish a world-wide caliphate through arme, ISIS’ methods have often been labeled as the most extreme out of a majority of the U.S designated terrorist organizations, frequently carrying out attacks, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and executions. However, varying from other jihadist terrorist groups, ISIS remains a persistent threat due to the fact that it is essentially an ideological movement not confined to a single area, in which ISIS seeks to brainwash and recruit followers from around the world, thus committing acts of terrorism in the name of the Islamic State. However, in 2019 ISIS lost nearly of all its territorial possessions due to an immense military crackdown by the United States, thus its methods shifted from boots on the ground militancy to insurgent tactics. Since its territorial defeat, the group has since begun its resurgence in Syria.
The fall of Bashar al-Assads regime in Syria signifies a significant shift in power and political dynamics within the country, only being exacerbated due to the new president being a jihadist and former member of al-Qaeda. This development carries major implications for regional security and potential widescale resurgence of extremist groups like ISIS. Therefore, it is vital for the United States and allied regional actors to monitor the state of Syrian affairs and political sentiment, amping up intelligence gathering, curbing the growth and assimilation of ISIS into Syrian governance. However, it is necessary to highlight the current state of ISIS as well as the dynamics and relationships between Syria’s governing authority and the Islamic State.
In the beginning of 2024, ISIS amped up its attacks and operations in territory occupied by Assads regime, with attacks tripling compared to 2023. The poor military capabilities of Assads regime provided a window for ISIS to resurface and revert to similar methods used in the mid-2010s. With attacks spiking in March of 2024, the Islamic State had “killed more people in parts of Syria controlled by the Assad regime than at any point since July 2018.” [1] This, however, created complications as the deconfliction agreement between the U.S and Russia prohibited U.S military and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces from striking ISIS targets south of the Euphrates River. However, this limitation changed when Assad was overthrown by Hayat Tahir al-Sham. The same day as Assads ousting, the U.S Air Force conducted 75 separate strikes against ISIS sites south of the Euphrates. [2] With the absence of Assad and largescale Russian military presence of that prior to December 8, the U.S is now the sole actor in the region capable and willing to confront ISIS. Since the initial strikes, U.S military and intelligence has maintained a significant presence within Syria, with aircraft frequently seen conducting aerial patrols of numerous Syrian provinces. Furthermore, U.S intelligence played a crucial role in exposing an ISIS plot and preventing a suicide bombing at the Sayyida Zaynab shrine on January 11, 2025. According to an article posted by the Middle East Institute on April 14, ISIS carried out an average of 59 attacks per month in 2024. However, it has since fallen to 12 after Assads overthrow. Furthermore, the deadliness of ISIS attacks has fallen 97 percent, with an average of 63 killed per month falling to an average of only 2 per month. [3] While the Islamic State’s foothold in Syria has significantly decreased since Assads overthrow, the future of ISIS operations remains uncertain and dangerous due to the current state of Syria’s governance and political landscape.
Small Wars Journal writer Jeremy Hodge argues that instead of focusing on the group’s ability to carry out attacks in Syria, the U.S and its allies should be more concerned with ISIS’ efforts to “exploit the normalization of Salafi-Jihadism under the country’s new regime,” [4] to which ISIS could use as a cover to spread its radical ideology and agenda, in turn strengthening its regional grip, recruitment, and revenue streams. It is important to note that there are two primary aspects behind the Islamic State in a post-Assad Syria: the need to control economic assets and industries to survive as an organization and the move to recruit more fighters under the normality of the far-right extremist sentiment in Syria, effectively assimilating and infiltrating Syrian governance and armed forces. While the main body of ISIS is unlikely to follow through with said actions, smaller operatives or cells could due to the current situation in Syria.
Since 2019, ISIS has confined its operations and attacks to the central desert in Syria, which holds many industries and sources of revenue, such as oil and gas reserves. Through the operations of said industries, ISIS seeks to tax and extort them to fund itself as an organization, ensuring its ability to survive. Author Jermey Hodge highlights that if ISIS wishes to expand its stream of revenue, it will thus seek to exploit and integrate its forces into state security personnel and other commercial and black-market sectors of Syria’s economy. On the other hand, it’s likely that the normalization of jihad on a state level will allow for and create an increasingly radicalized society, thus easing the process for ISIS fighters and operatives to slip into the cracks of new employment opportunities in state institutions. Historically, HTS, ISIS, al-Qaeda, and several other Syrian rebel and extremist groups have recruited from the same area and demographic of people, focusing on Sunni communities and networks. This has created significant overlaps and ties between groups, members, and leaders, with many extremist groups having ties with each other. Furthermore, the ability for ISIS to integrate into Syrian state forces will be eased due to HTS and their large number of alliances with dozens of other jihadist groups in Syria. For example, Uighur, Uzbek, Tajik, Afghan, Chechen, and an onslaught of Arab rebel groups all have a significant hold in Syrian militancy and now government. Looking further into the leadership and membership of said groups, it is very common to find former members of ISIS and al-Qaeda. On December 30, 2024, HTS appointed six foreign Jihadist fighters to the ranks of colonel and brigadier general within the country’s new army. This highlights the role that Jihad, or at least the legacy of jihad and past Islamism will play in Syria’s new government, with Syria acting as a jihadi paradise for foreign fighters, as non-Syrian nationals have repeatedly ascended to the ranks of high governance in Syria.
The resurgence of ISIS in 2024 and the empowerment of Abu Muhammad al-Julani, former al-Qaeda member and Syria’s new president, poses the potential for a new form of the Islamic State. While the resurgence may not look like the 2014, it will be quieter, more localized, and deeply embedded within Syrian government and society. Therefore, terrorist threats will be harder to detect and more dangerous to not only regional security but also the international community, as ISIS may be able to rebuild its strength under a different name and flag. Therefore, it is vital for the United States, regional allies, and the new government of Syria to cooperate to prevent the resurgence of ISIS, as Julani and HTS has often fought ISIS in the past. It is incredibly important for intelligence and national security officials to not ignore any warning signs that allude to an increasingly radicalized Syria amongst all aspects of governance and armed forces. Therefore, it is necessary to increase U.S presence in Syria, whether it is through direct diplomacy, intelligence and covert action, or indirectly through proxies like the SDF, it is vital to keep close tabs on Syria and have the ability to carry out military action if the ISIS threat re-emerges at a level similar to 2014. On the other hand, the U.S must combat the Islamic States ability to self-finance itself through protecting economic and industrial sectors, eliminating past sources of income for ISIS.
The Threat of ISIS remains a major security concern for the Middle East and the West, as their propaganda campaigns seeks to recruit and brainwash foreigners to commit acts of terrorism, to which it has succeeded in the past. However, in an everchanging geopolitical landscape, and due to the increase in regional conflicts and tensions due to the Israel-Hamas war, the landscape and conditions for radicalization remain high. Through this ISIS may seek to exploit not only increased anti-west sentiment but also the power vacuum created in Syria, making the future threat of ISIS uncertain and complex. Therefore, the Islamic State and the other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda must remain at the forefront of American foreign policy and counterterrorism measures to prevent future threats to regional security and the West.
[1] The Islamic State Keeps Finding Opportunities – War on the Rocks
[2] U.S. Central Command conducts dozens of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria > U.S. Central Command > Press Release View
[3] ISIS is on the ropes in Syria. A successful transition in Damascus could deliver a knockout blow | Middle East Institute
[4] The Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University
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