March 23, 2026.
In early March 2025, clashes broke out between Assad loyalists and Syrian security forces in the coastal region of Latakia. However, after initially beginning as an attack on state forces, the clashes triggered a much larger sectarian conflict, leading to the massacre of approximately 1,000 Alawites, most of them civilians.[1] The attack was carried out by “some state units” and “government-aligned forces,” with the primary perpetrators being foreign fighter units within HTS’s coalition umbrella, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party and Sultan Suleiman Shah Division.[2] Both of these groups have since been integrated into the Syrian security forces, with the TIP and other jihadist factions making up the 84th Division of the Syrian Armed Forces, a unit comprised entirely of foreign fighters. Jihadist groups that fought with Sharaa during the Syrian Civil War are now undergoing a process of “reflagging,” in which these groups maintain the same leadership, units, and tactics but are integrated into state forces and no longer operate under their original names.
This factor is likely to have devastating effects not only on President Sharaa’s ability to consolidate and maintain power in Syria, but also on counterterrorism efforts and ISIS containment in the country. These jihadist groups represent a “double-edged sword,” as they were vital to Sharaa during the civil war but now serve as a liability, with many expressing antagonism and discontent toward Sharaa’s post-Assad policies. It is likely that groups that previously fought under the HTS coalition will increasingly denounce Sharaa’s policies and form breakaway factions. Former HTS allies have already demonstrated signs of internal disagreement with Sharaa. For example, in October 2025, clashes broke out with Firqat al-Ghuraba, a former HTS ally. Furthermore, more than 10 members of Ansar al-Islam, another former HTS ally, were arrested for plotting a coup against Sharaa.[3] Additional internal clashes of this nature are likely, with hardline HTS fighters and leaders potentially breaking away from Sharaa’s government as he continues to make deals with the West and arrest select high-ranking foreign fighters.
At the same time, the resurgence of ISIS poses a significant threat at a level not seen since 2019. ISIS maintains more than 3,000 fighters across Syria and Iraq, and due to increasing ideological rifts within Sharaa’s coalition, some ISIS sympathizers may already be embedded within Sharaa’s government and military units.[4] Furthermore, ISIS has called on dissatisfied HTS fighters to defect into the rural areas of Syria and integrate with the Islamic State.
This issue appears to have no immediate resolution, as the question of foreign fighters and their citizenship is set to be revisited in 2030 under the Syrian Constitution.[5] While integration of fighters into the armed forces may work under certain conditions, foreign fighters are currently being integrated as entire units rather than as individuals. As a result, they maintain their organizational structures and continue to operate largely as before, only under new names. External sponsors may further complicate integration efforts, as some factions maintain independent funding streams and networks outside state control, with actors such as Turkey playing a significant role. Under this framework, these radicalized fighters are likely to continue posing a threat, and it may only be a matter of time before clashes erupt again in Syria. However, the likelihood of further fragmentation depends largely on whether Sharaa continues to “Westernize” Syria and pursue cooperation with the West or instead shifts toward accommodating his jihadist partners and their ideology, many of whom had previously operated under Sharia law.
[1] From Insurgency to Statecraft: Al-Sharaa and Syria’s Foreign Fighters Test – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[2] Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
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