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Author: admin

  • Managing Foreign Jihadist Fighters in Post-Assad Syria: Evaluating U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Options

    April 23, 2026. Abstract: This study analyzes the growing problem of foreign fighters in Syria and assesses the challenges they pose to U.S. counterterrorism objectives, regional stability, and the prevention of an ISIS resurgence. It evaluates how the integration of jihadist factions into Syrian state institutions contributes to sectarian violence, institutional fragmentation, and opportunities for…

  • Jihadists Threaten Stability in post-Assad Syria

    March 23, 2026. In early March 2025, clashes broke out between Assad loyalists and Syrian security forces in the coastal region of Latakia. However, after initially beginning as an attack on state forces, the clashes triggered a much larger sectarian conflict, leading to the massacre of approximately 1,000 Alawites, most of them civilians.[1] The attack…

  • Analyzing the December 2025 Terrorist Attack in Palmyra, Syria

    March 16, 2026. On December 19, 2025, the United States military began Operation Hawkeye Strike, a series of large-scale airstrikes against ISIS weapons sites and infrastructure in Syria. While the operation was aimed at disabling and preventing a resurgence of ISIS, Secretary Hegseth stated that it was “not the beginning of a war,” but instead…

  • Sharaa’s Foreign Fighter Problem

    March 9, 2026. On May 14, 2025, President Trump met with Syrian de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh. At the meeting, Trump urged Sharaa to “sign onto the Abraham Accords with Israel, tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria, deport Palestinian terrorists, help the United States prevent the resurgence of ISIS, and assume responsibility…

  • ISIS Threatens Syria’s President, Calls for Attacks on the West.

    February 23, 2026. Syria’s president, Ahmed al-Sharaa has come under recent fire by ISIS’s media and propaganda wing. The group called Sharaa a “puppet without a soul” controlled by the West, stating that he will have a similar fate as Bashar al-Assad. The audio message, delivered by ISIS spokesman Abu Huzaifa al-Ansari, is the first…

  • Syria Attends Anti-ISIS Coalition Meeting

    February 15, 2026. In a move reflecting evolving regional dynamics, the Damascus government recently joined the U.S-led coalition to combat ISIS. The Syrian government became the 90th member in November of last year, attending their most recent meeting in Saudi Arabia on February 9. The meeting follows an agreement between the SDF and the Sharaa government…

  • Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa Meets with Putin for Second Visit

    February 3, 2026. Ahmed al-Sharaa, former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Syria’s al-Qaeda branch, assumed power late in 2024 after ousting Bashar al-Assad. Fourteen months later on, January 28, Sharaa made his second visit to Russia, “attempting to repair relations” and hash out details surrounding the future of Russia’s “military presence in Syria.” The…

  • Clashes in Syria Threaten ISIS Prisons and U.S Strategy

    January 25, 2026. Recent clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government have disrupted operations and security at prisons holding ISIS fighters in northeastern Syria. As the Damascus government continued its offensive to annex parts of northeastern Syria, the SDF withdrew, abandoning control over prison facilities such as the al-Hol camp. In…

  • Fragile Integration: The SDF, State Consolidation, and U.S. Counter-ISIS Strategy in Post-Assad Syria

    January 19, 2026. Aleppo Escalation and the Failure of Integration The January 6 clashes in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Achrafieh neighborhoods marked the most serious confrontation between Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-led SDF since the fall of the Assad regime. After several days of fighting, the SDF withdrew its forces from Aleppo on January…

  • Intelligence Failure: The 1998 Indian Nuclear Tests

    November 13, 2025. The United States Intelligence Community failed to provide advance warning of India’s 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran. Weak HUMINT collection, analytical bias, organizational flaws, and compartmentalized IMINT and GEOINT obscured critical warning signs. India’s deception and counterintelligence efforts further limited collection and analysis, reducing diplomatic options. This failure left U.S policymakers unprepared…