February 20, 2025.

On December 8^th Bashar al-Assad and his Ba’athist regime succumbed to the overwhelming pressure posed by militant group Hay’at Tahir al-Sham, leading to the fall of Assads Syria. As HTS closed in on the Syrian capital Damascus, Assad fled, leaving behind a country ravaged by 13 years of civil war and the rise and fall of the Islamic State, but more importantly in the eyes of policy makers, a country vacant of governance. This vacancy was quickly filled by HTS members and its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who assumed the presidency on January 29^th. The fall of Assad marks a pivotal moment in history for Syrians and the Middle East, and analyzing the various factors surrounding the past, present, and unpredictable future of a new Syrian leadership is crucial to understanding the regions ever evolving geopolitical landscape.

For many, the hasty offensive by HTS and overthrowing of Assad came as a surprise. The initial offensive was to be a limited operation, which both Turkey and HTS saw as only lasting a few weeks. HTS and the Syrian National Army were initially given the nod from Turkey to launch its offensive on the Syrian city of Aleppo, consolidating hard power as a means to negotiate the return of 3 million Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey. HTS and the SNA, backed by Turkey, initially planned to encounter heavy resistance, as they had been warned by both the Syrian Armed Forces and Russia. However, when HTS and the SNA began their offensive, Syrian state soldiers easily collapsed under the pressure, retreating from Aleppo. HTS, gaining further support from the Syrian people, continued the push for the capital, and Turkey, initially planning for a small operation, let the fight towards Damascus happen as a hopes to establish a significant hold and influence over Syria. The fall of Assad played out as a perfect storm and a combination of numerous factors. Firstly, the success of the operation was not just HTS, but also the result of mass support from the Syrian people. When Aleppo was taken and the success of the operation was observed by the public, mass demonstrations and support gave way, reviving a movement which mirrored that of what erupted during the Arab Spring. Another contribution to the demise of Assads regime is the weakening of Russia and Iran. Russia, focusing its resources in Ukraine, and Iran, weakened from Israeli confrontations with its proxies, struggled or neglected to give Assad the military support he needed to prevent the HTS advancement. Another background factor to consider is that its possible if Putin and Prigozhin not had a falling out its likely he would of sent a few thousand Wagner troops to assist Assad in combating the rebels. Furthermore, a large number of Syrian state soldiers surrendered or stopped fighting, further allowing the advancement of HTS. At this point In the conflict, many of the Syrian soldiers were conscripts who had gone months without pay and faced severe food scarcities, leaving many to stop serving the regime which as Stephen Cook, Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies put it, had killed their “neighbors and friends.” Therefore, those who remained loyal to the regime until the end were massively outnumbered.

Immediately following the regime change, Israel and the U.S immediately began taking advantage of the instability and power vacuum created as a result of Assads absence. Israel, the day the rebels took power, began a minor military offensive, moving the Israeli Defense Force further into the Golan Heights. Israeli also fearing the illegitimacy and turnover of dangerous weapons to the new jihadist-based government, began striking dozens of sites in Syria suspected of holding chemical weapons. The U.S at the same time upped its strikes against the Islamic State, perhaps striking various sights which were previously forbidden or had the potential to create an international issue. The panel then brought up the point that it is incredibly likely that following Assads ousting and the loss of Iranian influence, Israel had begun talking to the Trump “team” about if it was a perfect moment to strike Iranian nuclear sites, which would likely require the greenlight from the U.S.

The fall of Assad and loss of an Iranian ally poses the potential to be a minor or large setback for Iran depending on how they handle it. With the elimination of a pro-Iran Syria, the Islamic republic lost direct influence and accessibility to the Mediterranean and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. This shift in sub-regional power poses the potential to have significant domestic ramifications for Iran. Firstly, the Islamic Revolutionary Gurd Corps, an Iranian state armed group which is a key actor on behalf of Iran and its ties to proxies, is likely to diminish in size and influence, as Assads fall was seen as losing a war. However, it’s likely that this will not succeed due to Iran’s past of curbing internal uprisings and insurrections. While the fall of a pro-Iran Syria does eliminate a portion of Iran’s grip on the Middle East, it is not likely that Iran’s internal politics and foreign policy will be altered all that much. However, the future of Iran does depended on its ability to figure out a new regional policy, determining if as an ideological regime it is able to maintain its imperial reach.

The CFR panel, as do I, share skepticism over just how free and democratic the future of Syria will be. The legitimacy of Syria’s new president, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, becomes rather questionable due to his past affiliations with various terrorist organizations. Julani first became involved with jihadism during the U.S occupation of Iraq. There he joined al-Qaeda in Iraq and began building relationships with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, both well-known jihadist and founders of ISIS. After his release from a U.S prison, Julani went to Syria, leading a new organization called the al-Nusra Front which broke off from AQI. In 2017 Julani merged al-Nusra with other various jihadist groups after rejecting Baghdadis request to merge al-Nusra into ISIS. The new group was called Hay’at Tahir al-Sham. HTS, overthrowing Assads regime and establishing its leader as president, has pushed to distance itself from its former affiliates, promising a free and safe Syria for all Syrians. As much as I would like to believe Julani and hope his words are true, I do have my reservations and am skeptical of his rule.

When HTS took Damascus and Julani give his victory speech at the Umayyad Mosque, Julani stated that his accomplishment was a victory for Islam, not Syria or democracy, but Islam. This statement only reaffirms the potential for jihadism to still hold an influence over him, posing the question, is he truly reformed? The future of Syria and its new government is likely to an extremist one and not inclusive for Syria’s minorities. While Julani did state that his Syria was for all Syrians, he likely said that as a public relations move to eliminate the potential argument that Syria won’t be inclusive. While many world leaders share skepticism over Julani’s rule, it is incredibly important to closely monitor Syria and how well civil rights are upheld under the new government. It is also important for Syrian refugees returning to Syria to take extreme caution, especially minorities. It is too early to say if Julani truly is a changed man, and only time will tell. However, it is evident that Julani and his government are going to need to demonstrate an immense amount of strength, charisma, and wisdom to rebuild the ruble-filled country. If Julani truly does want to rebuild Syria for the better, then his first moves will be to consolidate power, not attempt to increase his hold over the country, as currently various other groups control territory in Syria, such as the Kurds. Currently, Israel controls the Golan Heights, Julani’s native land. However, in order to focus on consolidating his power, Julani must not try to take back the Golan Heights from Israel, instead focusing on rebuilding Syria’s current land possessions.

The absence of Assad and his authoritarian regime may lead to a resurgence in jihadist and extremist groups in the eastern Syria and potentially western Iraq. Therefore, the U.S will need to be engaged in some sort of aspect. Trump has stated in the past that he wants to completely withdrawal American troops from Syria. While there are not a lot of U.S troops in Syria, their position is incredibly important in order to contain and eliminate remaining ISIS cells. Depending on the goal and outcome of Julani’s rule, this can either be a big issue for the U.S and its allies or no issue at all. Currently, numerous armed groups remain in Syria and control various sects of territory in the country. There is a possibility that the civil war will pick up again to a similar scale like 2013 and 2014. The Kurds for example, have been engaged in armed conflicts with the Turkish backed Syrian National Army, which broke off from HTS after taking Aleppo with the sole goal of fighting the Kurdish. The future instability of Syria is put into question when you analyze a similar situation from the past. When Libyan rebel groups overthrew and killed Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the rebel groups began fighting each other in a brutal civil war which lasted until 2020. However, even if this does happen in Syria, it’s likely that Julani’s Turkish backed government and his armed forces will remain the most powerful belligerent in Syria. That is unless, a more powerful actor backed by Iran emerges within the coming months or years. If civil war continues in Syria amongst further belligerents, then the country will, as panel speaker Elliott Abrams, senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies put it, return to a “medieval” structure with various groups fighting over territory attempting to exert control.

While the rise of a new government in Syria poses potential issues to the international system, Syria may become a critical playing field amongst the U.S and Israel and Iran and Russia. The United States will continue to push for its interest while maintaining somewhat isolated from the regional politics. The security of Israel and Jordan, containing ISIS, and the possibility of removing Russian military bases from Syria remain at the top of U.S interest in Syria. Furthermore, the U.S will always favor a peaceful democratic outcome in Syria. However, what the Trump administration can do to achieve this is somewhat limited. That is where Israel comes into play. The U.S wants to have a say in Middle Eastern geopolitics, but doesn’t want to be directly involved. Therefore, Israel has demonstrated that they can be a legitimate actor representing U.S interest.  

On the other hand, Iran will attempt to rebuild its influence which it lost. They will likely do this not by immediate action but instead by funding new proxies, as they have done in the past. The funding of Iranian proxies has proved to be an effective method in increasing indirect power in the region, as was evident with the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, Hezbollah’s bombardment in northern Israel, and the Houthis attacks on container ships in the Red Sea. Without direct access to Hezbollah through Syria, its likely Iran will seek new proxies. The possibility of Iran using new proxies to consolidate power in Iraq and further develop their nuclear program is currently one of the primary goals of Iran.

The relationship between the United States and Iran will likely remain stagnant, with Iran pushing to engage in negotiations with the U.S, but will likely use this as a tactic to expedite their nuclear program. U.S-Iranian relations in regards to Syria depend heavily upon on Iran’s involvement in the region. As of now, tensions have slowed between Israel and Iran, partly due to a ceasefire with Hezbollah and Hamas and the elimination of Iran’s access to Lebanon through Syria. It is also possible that Qatar will attempt to become more involved in Syria, as they have supported Islamist groups in the past in order to maintain competition with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The balance of power amongst Syria, surrounding states, and the United States, is likely to shift in the following years, with the potential for Syria to become a key player in the ongoing tensions in the Middle East. The future of Syria remains undetermined, but it is evident that if Abu Mohammad al-Julani and his government are able to properly secure the country and instill a free and inclusive government, then the future of Syria will be that of a promising one, finding peace in chaos.

Source:

Media Briefing: What’s Next for Syria After Assad | Council on Foreign Relations